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ABSTRACT
Stratified medicine offers both opportunities and challenges to the conventional business models that drive pharmaceutical R&D. Given the increasingly unsustainable blockbuster model of drug development, due in part to  maturing product pipelines, alongside increasing demands from regulators, healthcare providers and patients for higher standards of safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness of new therapies; stratified medicine promises a range of benefits to pharmaceutical and diagnostic firms as well as healthcare providers and patients. However, the transition from ‘blockbusters’ to what might now be termed ‘niche-busters’ will require the adoption of new, innovative business models, the identification of different  and perhaps novel types of value along the R&D pathway, and a smarter approach to regulation to facilitate innovation in this area. In this paper we apply the Innogen Centre’s interdisciplinary ALSIS methodology, which we have developed for the analysis of life science innovation systems in contexts where the value creation process is lengthy, expensive and highly uncertain, to this emerging field of stratified medicine. In doing so, we consider the  complex collaboration, timing, coordination and regulatory interactions that shape business models, value chains and value systems relevant to stratified medicine. More specifically, we explore in some depth two convergence models for co-development of a therapy and diagnostic prior to market authorisation; highlighting the regulatory requirements and policy initiatives within the broader value system environment that have a key role in determining the likely success and sustainability of these models. 
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INTRODUCTION
The emergence of stratified medicine can be best understood in the context of a  pharmaceutical industry that has reached a level of maturity with small-molecule treatments, having struggled for at least two decades to sustain a blockbuster innovation model in the face of social, economic and technological challenges [1,2]. The maturity problem, put simply, arises from the fact that companies are finding it increasingly difficult to discover, develop and market novel products that are effective enough to compete with existing product ranges, safe enough to meet regulatory requirements, cheap enough to manufacture, and cost-effective enough to meet payers’ demands. 
This challenge is similar to that faced by the agro-biotechnology industry in the 1980s [3] and is leading to a productivity crisis in which year-on-year increases in R&D investment have not been matched by an equivalent increase in product approvals [4,2]. Although there is debate around the nature and extent of the so-called ‘innovation deficit’ [5-7], there is no doubt that, since the early 1990s companies have not been generating enough new high value compounds to sustain growth [8]. 
As with the agro-biotechnology industry sector [3], new knowledge and technologies emerging from the life sciences have been seen as the solution to these pipeline problems - 'We are overdue for another big splash of revolutionary change…. Our creativity needs new outlets…. Biotechnology will drive us into the next golden era" [9]. However, companies have struggled to achieve this transformation in the context of a traditional small molecule drug development system [10,11,1]  and the organisational structures built around that particular model. The number of novel biopharmaceutical products registered, for example with the US FDA, has not been sufficient to compensate for the growing deficit in the small molecule pipeline (Figure 1).
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Faced with this systemic problem [10], companies have engaged in repeated waves of strategic initiatives that at times appear more dictated by fashion than by rational analysis. These include mergers and acquisitions; spinouts, divestments and out-sourcing; more targeted pipelines; expanding pipelines to cover all major targets; translational medicine and organisational restructuring, including collaborations with academia to speed up drug development and limit early stage R&D costs [13, 1, 14]; more open innovation approaches; public-private partnerships [15,16] and, relevant to this paper, stratified  medicine and biomarkers [17-19].
Pammolli et al [20] claim that the decline in pharmaceutical R&D productivity is largely due to an increasing concentration of R&D investments in areas with a high risk of failure, predominantly areas of unmet medical need, which supports the  above argument about maturing product pipelines. These failures, particularly during Phase 2 clinical trials, and largely due to difficulties in proving safety and efficacy, have led to growing interest in biomarker studies and the broader ‘translational sciences’ [21,22].
Increasing regulatory demands have added to already spiralling R&D costs so that in 2007, the cost for a large pharmaceutical firm to bring one product to market, including the costs of the products that fail before gaining market approval, was estimated to be $1.24 billion [23,24]. The increasing mismatch between the cost of R&D for novel drugs and the number of approved products is illustrated in Figure 2.  
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There is now a growing interest, within the pharmaceutical industry and in policy and regulatory communities, in the development of stratified medicine as a strategy to run alongside  conventional drug development to fill currently un-met medical needs and at the same time to re-populate pharmaceutical company pipelines.  The UK Technology Strategy Board (TSB), for example, has initiated a number of funding streams around the development of the science underpinning stratified medicine and the business models and value systems needed to make it successful [25].  The Academy of Medical Sciences  has also addressed the scientific and economic challenges of stratified medicine [26] and there appears to be a growing consensus around the need for an integrated stratified medicine strategy. This article considers the options available for developing stratified medicine products and the tangible and intangible opportunities and bottlenecks that need to be addressed to extract value along the R&D pathway.
THE EMERGENCE OF STRATIFIED MEDICINE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO BLOCKBUSTER DRUG DEVELOPMENT
Stratified medicine emerged from genomics-related research and the development of new diagnostic approaches based on biomarkers. Previously referred to as ‘personalised medicine’ the new nomenclature reflects a more realistic approach that targets patient sub-populations rather than the individual. Stratified medicine also encompasses a broader range of clinical biomarkers, not just the molecular or genetic, shifting emphasis from ‘blockbuster’ drug development to what might be termed ‘niche-buster, although the positive impact on drug development pipelines that this implies has yet to be demonstrated.
While some individualised medicines are being developed, for example the cancer vaccine Oncophage, manufactured from an individual patient’s tumour using a heat-shock protein  [27], a more common approach is patient matching to a therapy based on a validated biomarker that shows likely response and/or adverse reactions (for example Genentech’s Herceptin, AstraZeneca’s’ Iressa,  Novartis’ Gleevec; and more recently Pfizer’s Xalkori). The biomarker may be identified through molecular, biochemical or imaging diagnostics, and stratification may be based on level of response to the drug (efficacy) or adverse reaction (safety). In some circumstances the disease, rather than the treatment, may be the principal basis for stratification. There is a great deal to be gained, commercially and clinically, from the development of stratified medicine as well as potential healthcare savings if drugs are better targeted. 
Despite these promises, multinational pharmaceutical firms still largely pursue variations of the blockbuster business model. There are a number of obstacles and challenges to establishing new business models for stratified medicine and successfully aligning the relevant industry sectors, regulatory regimes and healthcare delivery services. The stratified medicine business model, and the science and regulatory framework underpinning clinical biomarker studies, remain uncertain and therefore more risky as a replacement for the current strategy [28]. Business models will require innovation in product development and also in developing closer partnerships between different types of commercial organisation (pharmaceutical firms and diagnostic companies) and the currently diverse markets that they serve. This area will also require smarter regulatory environments to facilitate co-development of a therapy and  diagnostic, currently subject to quite different regulatory regimes.
THE ALSIS APPROACH: BUSINESS MODELS, VALUE CHAINS AND VALUE SYSTEMS FOR STRATIFIED MEDICINE
An analytic approach is needed that is capable of considering the structure of the biopharmaceutical and diagnostic industries and their competitive dynamics, the sustainability of different business models  in terms of development, market uptake and reimbursement, and the role regulatory regimes play in shaping innovation trajectories [29]. The approach should be able to consider the options to realise value that may exist at different stages in stratified medicine value chains and the commercial and regulatory barriers relevant to the promissory visions, expectations and broader public concerns that have been built around the field [30-33]. 
The Innogen Centre ALSIS methodology [34] is an interdisciplinary approach enabling quantitative and qualitative analysis of business models, value chains and value systems, along with scenario analysis to identify key factors and interactions that will determine the success or failure of a novel therapy or technology. It is designed to be used to support decision making at all levels, ranging from: small to multinational companies developing a business plan for a very specific therapy development; groups of firms involved in constructing a value chain that will operate nationally or internationally; or policy makers considering the impact of a new regulatory initiative on companies in various niches contributing to, for instance, a stratified medicine value chain. The methodology allows each category of actor either to consider the impact of their actions on others operating in the broader value system, or to consider what actions taken at other levels in the value system could affect their plans. The approach maps business models, value chains, and value systems, identifying key barriers and enablers, that can then be used to test a range of scenarios. The approach is currently being applied to regenerative medicine [34], the wheat value chain [35] and biofuel developments. 
In an area where terms are often defined loosely and inconsistently, we have adopted the following definitions as the basis for the ALSIS approach, outlined graphically in Figure 3: 
Business model
The business model is a generic plan applying to a class of firms that play a common identifiable role within an overall value chain. It describes the rationale for how firms within the sub-sector create, capture and deliver value.
Value chain
The value chain encompasses the full range of activities required to bring a product from conception to end use, including design, production, marketing, distribution and support to the final consumer. Depending on the nature of the opportunity and the complexity of the route to exploiting it, the value chain can encompass several business models operating in sequence or in parallel. 
Value system
The value system embeds one or more value chains in the wider economic, regulatory and political contexts, covering external factors that will either enable or constrain the ability of agents to implement their business models and to cooperate nationally and internationally to deliver value to stakeholders.
The ALSIS methodology is a novel approach to analysis of translational processes in life sciences as they apply to the development of new technologies or therapies. From business models up to value systems, each level in this hierarchy brings in additional sets of actors, roles and ambitions, and scenario analysis enables future interactions within the value systems to be tested and evaluated from the business, regulatory or customer perspective. 
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In the context of stratified medicine, value chains will incorporate at least two, not always complementary, business models (the diagnostic business model and the pharmaceutical business model). These value chains are located within a value system that brings in consideration of the wider economic, legislative and political contexts - the system’s environment [29], regulatory barriers and uncertainties being major factors in the success or failure of stratified medicine business models. 
A full analytic process involving the methodology would map strategies and related decision making by those involved in the development of therapies, preferably based on in-depth interviews with key actors in companies, markets and regulatory agencies. Where possible sections of these strategic maps would then be modelled quantitatively. The intention is to demonstrate where most value can potentially be created, to identify the key pressure points and hurdles that raise challenges for particular business models and can thus have an impact on the entire value chain, and to enable decision makers to plan more effectively for success in very uncertain innovation environments. 
This paper is a preliminary analysis based on desk studies that can be seen as a basis for a full analysis of stratified medicine value systems. We have considered two summary business models, for the development of diagnostic tools and for therapeutics (Figures 4 and 5), and explored their potential interactions and opportunities to collaborate in the development of stratified medicinal products. Important factors in the value system environment will include regulatory requirements and policy initiatives (the main focus of this paper), but also financing the long-term investments needed to deliver products in this area, and reimbursement and market dynamics for stratified medicine (which we have not considered in detail here).
Linking biomarker discovery and the development of a diagnostic test with a conventional pharmaceutical development business model requires consideration of some important underlying factors [27]. On the biological side, there must be: underlying disease variability, indistinguishable clinical symptoms for biologically distinct conditions; multiple targets for therapeutic intervention; differential absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion (ADME) characteristics, toxicity or tolerability of the therapy; or an adaptive disease that can lead to treatment resistance [27]. Furthermore, there must be a number of treatment options with heterogeneous responses for the disease as well as an acceptable and clinically validated biomarker. However, variation in efficacy or safety within a patient population is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a stratified medicine approach to succeed, according to Trusheim et al. The clinical variability must also be sufficiently broad to make the search for an optimal therapy worthwhile (clinical benefit must exceed the cost of identifying the patient sub-populations).   In summary, relative therapeutic performance and prevalence of a biomarker that has demonstrable clinical validity ultimately determines the viability of any business models structured around stratified medicine. 
We have considered two key potential convergence scenarios for the co-development of a diagnostic test, based on a validated biomarker and a drug therapy aiming to identify responders, non-responders and adverse responders in a defined patient population. 
1. Co-development of a diagnostic and a therapy from the beginning of the R&D process. 
A novel product in the pre-clinical phase of development is thought likely to benefit from the co-development of a  companion diagnostic test.  This is the most radical and pathbreaking approach to stratified medicine from both pharmaceutical and diagnostic perspectives, as it requires an early commitment to a particular value chain model, with implications for risk and benefit sharing, intellectual property and product lifecycle management and value creation. Diagnostic firms have very different pipelines from pharmaceutical firms [36], including different R&D strategies and value systems, raising difficulties for successful integration. 
2.  Co-development of a diagnostic and a therapy beyond Phase 2 or 3 clinical trials.  In this case, safety and/or efficacy issues have arisen for a drug in mid to late stage development and there is evidence that it could be ‘rescued’ through the identification of a biomarker and  development of an associated diagnostic test to identify patient subpopulations of responders, non-responders and adverse responders. The drug developer may seek a partnership with a diagnostic firm, with convergence of two distinct business models to form a new value chain mid way through drug development. 
A third scenario, which we do not explore in this paper, would be the development of a diagnostic test to stratify a patient population during Phase 4 post-marketing surveillance. Here a product on the market is found to have safety or efficacy issues and the drug developer looks for a biomarker and diagnostic test to stratify the market and sustain the product’s profitability. Alternatively, a diagnostic company may attempt to identify relevant biomarkers and associated diagnostic tests for a range of therapies currently on the market. 
The two scenarios that are the focus of this paper have a number of interrelated variables: whether stratification will be based on safety or efficacy of the drug; the nature and type of the diagnostic test and its associated biomarker; and the specificity of the therapy and its disease target. These require co-development of therapy and diagnostic, the integration of two different business models, and successful exploitation of novel value chains, given a complex and uncertain external value system. The pharmaceutical firm could seek to develop both the biomarker and therapy in-house, which may be the most appropriate way forward in the future, but much emphasis is being placed on co-development involving  pharmaceutical and diagnostic firms working in collaboration, with convergence at different stages of the pharmaceutical R&D process. This analysis therefore focuses on the co-development of a therapy and diagnostic prior to market authorisation of the therapy, either before Phase 1 or after Phase 2 clinical trials for the therapeutic product. 
Figure 4 shows a summary value system map of a co-development value chain with convergence of pharmaceutical and diagnostic business models at the preclinical phase. This is the idealised model that is often assumed to represent the future for stratified medicine. Regulators such as the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) in the United States, and government agencies such as the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) in the UK, are actively promoting early stage co-development models for stratified medicine. However, this model is risky and it is not clear how sustainable value creation can be delivered.  
Figure 5 shows a value system that is more likely to be viable, with convergence after Phase 2 clinical trials, when there will be preclinical and early clinical data relevant to the identification of a suitable diagnostic test.  
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These maps provide a basis for analysis of the challenges and opportunities for co-development of drugs and diagnostics. The following sections explore these issues as they relate to commercial and regulatory impacts with a focus on the impact of the clinical trials that are of critical importance to the sustainability of co-development value chains. 

COLLABORATION ACROSS PHARMACEUTICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC BUSINESS MODELS – IMPLICATIONS FOR VALUE CREATION
A successful stratified medicine value chain will require reconciliation of different business models, depending on whether there are single or multiple therapies for a given condition, and/or a number of biomarkers and potential diagnostic tests available. However, even for a single diagnostic test associated with a specific biomarker and therapy, business models and value propositions could be structured in a number of different ways.   
Pharmaceutical firms are now showing interest in biomarkers and  the co-development of associated  diagnostics to facilitate understanding of a therapy’s mode of action and its safety and efficacy in patient sub-populations. Thirty to fifty percent of drugs in development have an associated biomarker and this number is expected to rise [37]. However, drug companies have had mixed results in combining diagnostic biomarkers with clinical development programmes, largely because of difficulties in establishing the clinical utility of biomarkers [28] and exploiting the new tools required of stratified medicine [38]. 
Relevant questions  when considering a co-development value chain are: what value can be created at different stages of R&D for the diagnostic and pharma partners; how might convergence of different business models overcome existing pipeline problems for both sectors; and what challenges from the value chain and from the value system can be identified and overcome.
Diagnostic firms may seem to have most to gain from stratified medicine, given that in vitro diagnostics are currently undervalued compared to their drug counterparts because payers tend to reimburse for laboratory services on a cost-based, rather than a value-based, system [28]. In contrast, in the pharmaceutical model reimbursement is very much value based.   Stratified medicine could allow diagnostic firms to capture new sources of value within a therapy/diagnostic combination, but the shift to a new type of business model, involving a more demanding regulatory system, would be more path-breaking for a diagnostic company than for a pharmaceutical company. Ferrara suggests that diagnostic companies are currently pursuing the easier  commercial opportunities of developing diagnostic tests for therapies already on the market. They would have to take much greater control of the reimbursement process to capture a larger share of the value  [28]. 
One long-term strategy for diagnostic firms would be to link diagnostic test development to drug development programmes and launch the drug and diagnostic simultaneously. This could be attractive if the drug is a success and the rewards are shared.  Thus for co-development value chains the diagnostic firm will want to ensure that it is not only reimbursed for the diagnostic test but also has an agreed share in the success of the therapy.  However, a major risk for a diagnostic company is that the fate of the diagnostic is tied to that of the drug, and many drugs fail in Phases 1 and 2 clinical trials. Convergence of business models at Phase 3 (as in Figure 5) is less risky than convergence in the preclinical phase (as in Figure 4). In either of these situations, the diagnostic company would have the option to evaluate alternative markets for the test if the drug failed, but under the Figure 4 model it would have wasted more time, money and resource in the failed development.  
For the pharmaceutical manufacturer, there is value in a stratified medicine co-development strategy if the time and cost of drug development can be reduced (for example through smaller, better defined clinical trials with biomarkers potentially providing surrogate endpoints) and if the risk of failure in Phase 1 or 2 clinical trials can be reduced. A premium could be charged on the combined product to offset the reduction in revenues from a smaller market. 
In the early convergence value chain (Figure 4), some development costs can be shared between the pharmaceutical company and the diagnostic firm and there is scope for preclinical  data integration and planning that could lead to better designed clinical trials, leading to identification of the most useful stratification markers.  Early convergence also allows for the use of a novel biomarker to confirm the therapy’s mode of action. The benefits of this early stage convergence include the ability to enter joint early talks with regulators, potentially to tailor regulatory requirements to the combined therapy plus diagnostic test, an option that is less likely to be available for a Phase 2/3 convergence model when delays for the pharmaceutical company to find a diagnostic partner, and discover  and clinically validate a biomarker and diagnostic test, could significantly  increase the time and cost of development of the drug. 
The risks of early collaboration, when there is limited knowledge about the drug, the biomarker and the end market, are high and will be a major barrier to this model. Convergence after Phase 2 (Figure 5) where the diagnostic development process begins later and is linked to a drug that has already generated preclinical and clinical data is likely to be more attractive, at least to diagnostic companies.
Pharmaceutical firms are most interested in the potential of stratified medicine to enable a premium to be charged for guaranteed efficacy and/or greater safety or reduced side effects. Early convergence, as in Figure 4, would not necessarily have a more positive financial impact for them than convergence after Phase 2 clinical trials have been  completed (Figure 5), provided there is a diagnostic company willing and able to develop the diagnostic tool independently.  
Regardless of where it arises across the value chain, tight coupling of the diagnostic and therapy can create novel sources of value and raise barriers to entry. Trusheim et al. argue: 
‘As a gatekeeper to patients, the diagnostic becomes a portal through which subsequent therapies must pass, and it can promote initial adoption of a particular therapy, potentially expanding the value of the market for the therapy’ [27]. 
They claim that it is not obvious how value should be partitioned in such a scenario. Sometimes patent life or reimbursement norms will shift value to the drug but in other cases the value may shift more towards the diagnostic. IP sharing  will be crucial to the success of a co-development model - if it is attached to the drug, the diagnostic company may not see a route to long-term, sustainable value creation. It is important to consider the different business models of the individual companies contributing to a value chain, in the context of the broader value system bringing in regulatory regimes and reimbursement systems.  The ALSIS approach maps relevant steps in company business models to trace potential routes to market, indicating where value can be secured along the R&D pathway (Figures 4 and 5). The value propositions available will depend on the type of biomarker or diagnostic technology and the nature of the therapy to which it relates. The field of oncology has so far proved most amenable to a stratified medicine approach.  
There is not yet a proven value chain configuration that will suit all approaches to stratified medicine although any co-development strategy will need to be based on shared risk and reward. The challenge is to link two very different business models. The technologies, processes of discovery and validation, and the time and cost of development are radically different for a diagnostic firm compared to a multinational pharmaceutical company. The challenge is to synchronise the development phases so that data sharing and knowledge spillovers happen at the point where convergence occurs, and also to predict where different sources of value may materialise downstream and to ensure the collaborative agreement can capture this for the benefit of both partners. 
 The potential for loss of value to either the diagnostic or therapy at some point in this co-development strategy should not be underestimated and to date there are few successful co-development value chains. As the TSB [39] recognises, there are more perceived barriers than positive drivers for co-development models, including differences in  regulatory requirements, company cultures and structures, and development times and processes. The complexity of project management for a diagnostic/therapy combination is also a significant challenge. 
TIMING AND COORDINATION ISSUES FOR CO-DEVELOPMENT VALUE CHAINS
An ideal stratified medicine approach would include validated biomarkers or a diagnostic test early in the development process to identify variation in patient sub-populations related to drug efficacy or safety. If the diagnostic is not in place alongside the therapy, there is a risk that the diagnostic will fail in development [40]. Likewise, Phase 2 attrition, a major challenge facing the pharmaceutical industry, could be reduced if biomarkers can be found to stratify the patient community. A value chain based on convergence prior to Phase 1 clinical studies thus seems in theory to favour both diagnostic and pharmaceutical companies. 
However, this is only beneficial for the diagnostic company if the value derived from the combined product covers the cost of the time delays and the additional risks of linking its development to a therapeutic. Later convergence in the value chain (Figure 5) may be less risky and ultimately more valuable for the diagnostic firm given that the therapy will be closer to market with less uncertainty attached to its eventual success. Alternatively, given that the cost of a Phase 2 clinical trial is approximately $319 million [41], the ability to ‘rescue’ drugs at this stage through use of biomarkers to identify responders is potentially very valuable to a pharmaceutical company. Thus, risk-benefit and commercial viability for each partner in the value chain will depend on the status of their component product in terms of clinical utility, location in the value chain and susceptibility to value system factors such as regulators and healthcare providers (as payers). 
Trusheim et al have noted that:
‘Effective co-development coordination necessitates the alignment of objectives , resources, timelines and incentives, and often requires investment decisions without a deep understanding of either the underlying biology or optimal diagnostic platform’ [40].
In Figure 4, uncertainty about the final market (size of patient sub population and the premium that could be charged for a targeted therapy) will affect the value proposition and structure of any collaborative model entered into  before the start of clinical studies. There will be significant risks related to the development of the diagnostic and the therapy, individually and in combination. In these models, the drug development pipeline perhaps has most to lose. If the diagnostic fails the drug is unlikely to succeed unless another biomarker and/or test can be discovered. If the drug fails, the diagnostic could potentially be used or modified for another therapy or purpose and in any case the value of the investment in the development process for a diagnostic test is much less than for a drug. 
This raises the question of how far a pharmaceutical company will be willing to share the profits of a combined therapy/diagnostic tool. As Naylor and Cole [42] argue, pharmaceutical and diagnostic companies generally have different views about where the value lies. The pharmaceutical company is interested in the companion diagnostic only insofar as it adds value to a therapy. The diagnostic firm is primarily interested in developing a test of optimised specificity at minimal cost and selling it to the client at a maximum price. Historically, diagnostic companies have had no commercial interest in the therapy itself. Naylor and Cole argue that there are options for structuring deals that either front-load premiums for the diagnostic innovator or back-end deals with generous royalty payments, but our analysis suggests that deals early in the development process would require a much higher degree of certainty about downstream routes to market, opportunities for value creation, and understanding of the whole value system before rational decisions about risk and benefit sharing can be made. If the diagnostic firm is locked into cost-based reimbursement for only the diagnostic, the co-development model based on pre-Phase 1 convergence is unlikely to be viable. Phase 3 convergence may be viable, but still would not be ideal for the diagnostic firm. 
The relatively independent business models for pharmaceutical and diagnostics manufacturers and their very different timelines may be too diverse  for stratified medicine to succeed.  As the Academy of Medical Sciences argues, the former continues to be based on high margin/high risk and IP-protected blockbuster assumptions, whilst the latter is based on low margins, platform-based technology and assumptions based on high volume [26]. For the diagnostic firm, delaying the ultimate product launch to meet therapeutic development phases is unlikely to be worth the potential benefits, which seem at the moment to be skewed towards the pharmaceutical firm. However, there has been a demonstrable commitment amongst companies to experiment with new business models and to identify opportunities for value creation within a stratified medicine paradigm.
REGULATORY AND REIMBURSEMENT CHALLENGES
This section considers proposed changes to current regulatory systems for pharmaceuticals and diagnostic tools and their impacts on stratified medicine value chains and reimbursement options. Currently, a co-development value chain would require the diagnostic to be validated and approved by one part of the regulatory system and the therapy to be validated by another, limiting the  extent to which new value chains for stratified medicine can emerge and grow. Regulators are now envisaging companion diagnostics as part of a combined product, removing this historic divide and developing a single, coherent risk-based regulatory system as the default for all stratified therapies. Whilst patient safety and product efficacy are crucial to appropriate risk management, there is increasing recognition that changes to regulatory systems need to be undertaken with a good understanding of regulation/innovation interactions if they are to avoid unintended negative effects on innovation pathways [4,29].
The costs associated with gaining regulatory approval for both the drug and the clinical biomarker/diagnostic tool will require careful regulatory co-ordination and joint clinical trial design. The diagnostic firm could benefit from a successful, combined clinical trial that provided additional assurance of validity and potentially higher value for the diagnostic tool. However, the relative cost and risk of engaging in such a process for a diagnostic firm is likely always to exceed the potential benefits [43]. Costs and uncertainties around regulatory requirements will thus have a major impact on the stratified medicine value chain, probably more significant for the diagnostic company than for the pharmaceutical firm. 
The European Clinical Trials Directive promises much in terms of harmonising standards and approval processes across the European Union, but there remain bureaucratic barriers and uncertainties, which will affect the speed and successful implementation of new value chains for stratified medicine. Relevant regulatory changes are arising particularly through the In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices Directive (Directive 98/79/EC) and in the UK the TSB [39] has suggested the creation of an expert committee (similar to the Committee for Advanced Therapies as part of the European Advanced Therapies Medicinal Products regulation) to act as an enabler of stratified medicine and to make the value chain for a co-development strategy more viable for both pharmaceutical and diagnostic companies.
The US FDA has outlined its commitment to stratified medicine in the Critical Path Opportunities Report [44], where it supported the identification and validation of new biomarkers and innovative clinical trial design as a means of driving drug development forward in the broader context of the pharmaceutical  innovation gap. The FDA now has an initiative to facilitate the development of biomarkers and to ensure that regulations for diagnostics are fit for purpose and, crucially, aligned with the regulation of medicinal products in cases where co-development is taking place [45]. However the systems for drug regulation (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and Center for Biologic Evaluation and Research) and for diagnostic regulation (Centre for Devices and Radiological Research) are not yet synchronised in any formal sense. 
The promise of radically new approaches to clinical trials that facilitate innovation thus has not yet been comprehensively implemented in either the US or Europe.  However, regulators have been flexible in clinical trial design on a case-by-case basis for certain products deemed capable of satisfying an unmet medical need and we should take the opportunity to learn as much as possible about regulation/innovation interactions from these precedents [46].
One benefit of being able to stratify responders early in the development of a therapy (Figure 4) is the option to design smaller and more efficient clinical trials. For a pharmaceutical company, the ideal outcome from an investment in a co-developed stratified medicine would be a product that allowed it to reduce the time and cost of clinical trials and also to charge a premium for the product in a segmented patient market, going some way to compensate for the smaller overall market share. 
The value chain described in Figure 4, based on convergence prior to clinical trials would benefit most from the ability to exploit adaptive clinical trials that would provide preclinical data about the biomarker, therapy and diagnostic test to inform subsequent trials stages.  This is particularly important to mitigate the risk of unintended consequences occurring further downstream from a poorly selected biomarker with limited knowledge of its clinical outcome [26]. Adaptive clinical trials would still benefit, to a lesser extent, the value chain described in Figure 5 with convergence just before Phase 3, allowing re-design of Phase 3 studies, for example to be conducted with fewer patients or different treatment protocols based on the new biomarker and diagnostic test. In Figure 4, the value chain would enable early joint discussions with regulators  to facilitate the development of the best regulatory package for the combined product, whereas convergence later in the development process (Figure 5) could potentially result in regulatory challenges, escalating costs and time delays. 
In the case of Figure 5, the benefits of adapting the clinical trial based on a newly discovered biomarker would require regulators to permit use of a clinical biomarker that was not in the original clinical trial design negotiated earlier in the process. It is not yet clear that regulators would permit this.  It is also not yet clear from either the FDA or EMA whether marker-negative patients will be required in Phase 3 trials, which is a major problem for both convergence models. Regulators are concerned that therapies may be used off-label in marker-negative patients if such a cohort is not included in the trial design. If marker-negative patients are required, then there will be no cost-saving or reduction in development time for the company [37]. Davis et al  do suggest that payers and regulatory bodies could increase the barriers to off label use to ensure the authorised therapy is not subsequently used in these marker negative groups.  However, it should also be noted that the cost of running a clinical trial limited to patient sub-populations exhibiting a particular clinical marker may not necessarily be cheaper and easier than a conventional clinical trial, as it could take time and cost more to both recruit and test the required patients. 
Conditional approval is another potentially useful option where the ability to go earlier to market, albeit under highly restricted and monitored conditions, may be more appropriate to stratified medicine than a conventional three stage clinical trial process. This also has a crucial implication for pricing and reimbursement.  There has been resistance so far to paying  for stratified medicine but there is also a recognised need for both pricing flexibility and value based reimbursement to incentivise innovation in this area. The Cooksey review of UK health funding [47] in considering opportunities for the development of stratified medicine, supported ‘conditional approval’ as a means to allow flexibility in pricing. If the therapy was found to be particularly effective in a patient subpopulation during the conditional approval stage, the company could renegotiate the price to reflect change in  the inherent value of the product [26]. Some system of flexible and value-based pricing will probably be necessary to enable pharmaceutical and diagnostic firms to develop viable value chains and to incentivise diagnostic companies to innovate in this area. The payment issue becomes most significant when we consider the cost of the diagnostic test in addition to the therapy, and the supply chains needed to deliver these in combination.   
Regulatory uncertainty is clearly creating challenges for the integration of pharmaceutical and diagnostic business models to deliver stratified medicine products, as described in Figures 4 and 5. As currently envisaged, both early and late convergence of these business models present problems to different degrees for diagnostic and pharmaceutical firms. While there is an urgent need to resolve these problems, past experience suggests that hasty regulatory action that fails to take account of regulation/innovation interactions can be even more problematic than continuing regulatory uncertainty or inconsistency [48]. 
Adaptive pricing and reimbursement systems for stratified medicine will require the coordinated efforts of many agencies to ensure that regulation, pricing and reimbursement of stratified medicine and its associated technologies are coherent and workable [49].  In the UK, this will require better coordination of the MHRA, NICE and the NHS, along with evidence of clinical value, before health care providers will pay premium prices. Meckley and Neumann [50] caution that the promise of stratified medicines has so far outpaced any evidentiary support. However, this analysis points to the path-breaking nature of these promises and the difficulty of current innovation and regulatory systems in adapting to changed innovation models as a major factor delaying progress in this area. 
There are some regulatory changes that could be implemented quite quickly to facilitate innovation in stratified medicine, and would support the viability of both our convergence models. First, Aspinall and Hamermesh [51] have argued that the FDA should create specific incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop diagnostics in tandem with targeted drugs. One way to do this would be to ‘fast-track’ the review of all new drugs that have a companion diagnostic to rationally select patients.  This would benefit patients who are able to get the drug much sooner, support the co-development business model and create real opportunities for value creation and cost savings across the whole value chain.  Second, it has been suggested that co-development business models could be further supported and encouraged by extending the patent life on drugs that have a companion diagnostic, as well as offering tax incentives and R&D grants [37]. One could also add that the option of orphan-drug status, or something similar, could be made available in cases where there is a very small patient sub-population for which the drug is either safe or effective. Both these options, in addition to conditional licensing and not requiring marker negative patients to be included in Phase 3 clinical trials, could make the value proposition s in both convergence models viable. 
Nevertheless, one outstanding question is to how the value should be partitioned between pharmaceutical and diagnostic partners. In the early stages, this will probably be decided on a case-by-case basis but the balance of negotiating power will usually lie with the pharmaceutical partner. In some cases the key value may be in the diagnostic tool, enabling it to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to a particular disease target or class of drugs, but in most cases value will reside in the therapy and the viability of the diagnostic business model will be in the number of patients to be tested, whether the test is required once or multiple times, and how much payers will be willing to pay for the diagnostic. The diagnostic partner is not helped by recent FDA draft guidance on In Vitro Diagnostic Devices , which states: 
‘When appropriate, the therapeutic product labeling should identify a type of FDA approved or cleared IVD companion diagnostic device (i.e., the intended use of the device), rather than a specific manufacturer's IVD companion diagnostic device. This will facilitate the development and use of more than one approved or cleared IVD companion diagnostic device of the type described in the labeling for the therapeutic product' [45]
This regulatory option would create competition for the diagnostic company and further reduce the incentive to engage in stratified medicine, unless it had already negotiated some share of the profits from the therapy. 
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS ‘SMART’ REGULATION AND INNOVATION IN STRATIFIED MEDICINE
This article has highlighted some of the barriers facing stratified medicine, in particular the challenges of a value chain that combines both therapeutic and diagnostic business models. We have mapped the most important elements of the co-development value chain and the associated value system, demonstrating the complexity faced by those attempting to create value in the context of a sustainable innovation pathway.  Significant issues include: how to handle the data complexity and the validation of new clinical biomarkers; how new business models and partnerships will be structured and implemented; and how current and future regulatory systems and government policies will shape the innovation system and the associated opportunities for value creation. In many senses, the clinical trial structure drives the co-development business model and determines where along the R&D pathway convergence between diagnostic and therapeutic business models is most likely to be feasible.
The Innogen Centre has proposed a set of principles that could be implemented to deliver smarter regulatory approaches for the life sciences sector [2,29,48, 52], including:
1.	Policymakers and regulators should consider both the positive and negative impacts  of proposed regulatory changes on different sectors within the innovation system and ensure regulatory systems are fit-for-purpose not only in ensuring safety and efficacy of products, but also facilitating innovation.
2.	Regulations that are appropriate for one area may have unforeseen, potentially negative impacts when applied to another area. For example, regulatory standards applied to medicinal products, and the clinical trial system designed for that sector, might not be appropriate for many diagnostics. For therapy/diagnostic combination products, it is important to ensure regulations for safety and efficacy are appropriate for both the drug and the diagnostic. 
3.	A regulatory system that is enabling (encouraging innovation and positive behaviour in industry) and discriminates among products on the basis of criteria that are scientifically, socially and economically relevant, is smarter than a policy that is indiscriminate and constrains what it considers undesirable behaviour.  The key for regulators in the stratified medicine field is to encourage a viable route to market for co-developed therapies and diagnostics and to incentivise firms. 
4.	In considering what specific regulatory initiatives to take forward for an emerging field of biomedical innovation, it is most useful to support industry sectors  for which the innovation is path-dependent rather than path-breaking. 
For stratified medicine, regulation can potentially transform the nature of various value propositions and the location of value across the R&D pathway. For example, if regulators insist that marker-negative patients be included in phase 3 clinical trials, the value chain that rested on lower cost and time spent conducting clinical trials would no longer exist, with negative impacts on a diagnostic firm’s ability to establish partnerships with pharmaceutical companies early in the development process. Similarly, in the absence of conditional licensing or similar initiatives to allow for flexibility in pricing, there may be little incentive to stratify the market. Regulatory bodies have an important role to play in ensuring that the new business models and value chains needed to spur innovation in stratified medicine are sustainable. Incentives would be needed to facilitate co-development strategies, particularly to ensure the diagnostic firms are able to generate sufficient revenue to offset the costs, time-delays and inherent risks that emerge when the diagnostic business model is intertwined with the therapeutic business model. 
We have outlined in the regulatory section proposals for regulatory approaches that could facilitate the development of stratified medicine and represent the kind of smart regulation  that we consider vital to sustainable innovation, providing incentives and opportunities for value creation. If the expectations around stratified medicine are to materialise, smart innovation and regulation is going to be needed to drive and exploit the various value propositions that are emerging. Since stratified medicine can potentially bring major benefits to patients, as well as provide commercial value for both pharmaceutical companies and diagnostic firms, it is important that policymakers, in consultation with all relevant stakeholders, think through the key enablers and barriers.
A further set of considerations emerges from this analysis in the context of the fourth principle of smarter regulation above - ‘facilitating industry sectors  for which the innovation is path-dependent rather than path-breaking’. We have observed that stratified medicine is unlikely to succeed unless pharmaceutical companies can see benefits to their business models. The ALSIS analysis indicated that there are currently few incentives or enablers of a co-development value chain for a stratified medicine, hence our suggestions for appropriate regulatory initiatives to support such outcomes. 
Looking at the situation from the pharmaceutical company perspective, the key question becomes who, if anybody, will develop the diagnostic component. The focus throughout this paper has been on encouraging diagnostic firms to contribute to these value chains and to find regulatory and reimbursement incentives that will enable this, given that a shift to pharmaceutical-style regulatory systems would be potentially path-breaking for diagnostic companies. The path-breaking impacts of stratified medicine are minimised, and the business model perhaps more viable, if the pharmaceutical company develops both  the diagnostic and drug in house. In ALSIS terms this amounts to extension of the pharmaceutical sector business model to incorporate diagnostics for stratified medicines, rather than the construction of a co-development value chain involving independent diagnostics  companies. The potentially greater economic viability of this approach rests on the observation that overall disruption of business models would be less under this scenario for pharmaceutical companies than for diagnostics companies. The fact that 30-50% of pharmaceutical drug development programmes already have a biomarker component suggests that pharmaceutical firms are already building internal capabilities in this area. 
If this were to emerge as a winning strategy, we could expect to see pharmaceutical companies purchasing diagnostic companies in order to bring the relevant expertise in house, comparable to the agro-biotechnology industry strategy of buying seed companies in order to develop GM crops in the 1990s. It would also support our suggestion that choice of regulatory system largely determines the industry sector that can successfully develop a new technology [29]. 
In future it will be important to extend this analysis by gathering data from key players in stratified medicine, map the value system fully and using the resulting qualitative and quantitative analysis to build a set of scenarios to predict where investment in stratified medicine can most usefully be made, given particular regulatory and reimbursement outcomes. 

Figure Legends

Figure 1: FDA Drug Approvals  (1996-2009) 
Figure 2: New Drug Approvals versus R&D Expenditure of US Pharmaceutical Firms (1963-2008)
Figure 3: Basic Representation ALSIS Methodology
Figure 4: Co-development value chain with convergence of pharmaceutical and diagnostic before phase 1 (created by authors)
Figure 5: Co-development value chain with convergence of pharmaceutical and diagnostic business models at Phase 2 (created by authors)
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